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CHANGES IN PENNSYLVANIA'S SENTENCING
PROCEDURES UNDER THE PROPOSED
"CODE OF SENTENCING PROCEDURE"
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no decision in the criminal process that is more com-
plicated and difficult than the one made by the sentencing judge.,
Although an offender's guilt is determined by a strict formal
procedure, his sentence is normally the product of a very informal
process. The vagaries of existing sentencing processes often
culminate in disparate sentences, the variations being attributable
to the individual philosophies of the sentencing judge and the dic-
tates of antiquated penal codes, rather than the character of the
offender and his rehabilitative needs.2 Recently, however, legal
authorities have recognized the importance of the sentence deter-
mination process in our criminal justice system.3 In Pennsyl-
vania the newly enacted Crimes Code 4 will undoubtedly contri-
bute to a more uniform definition of the substantive crimes; how-
ever, it contains no provisions which touch upon the area of crimi-
nal procedure and more specifically the sentencing process. Nev-
ertheless, the Pennsylvania Assembly is aware of the need for
change in the sentencing procedures currently employed by Penn-
sylvania's criminal courts, and is presently considering new legis-
lation in the form of a "Code of Sentencing Procedure."5  This
Comment is intended to compare the pertinent provisions of the
proposed Code with the existing statutory provisions and case law
currently defining Pennsylvania's sentencing procedure. The pro-
visions considered are those addressing the various sentencing al-
ternatives-total confinement, partial confinement, probation,
guilty without further penalty, and the fine. In addition, two
specific aspects of sentencing procedure-the presentence investi-
gation and report, and sentencing pursuant to a plea of guilty to
murder, will be discussed.
1. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
141 (1967). [hereinafter cited as CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY1.
2. See Kessler, Anomalous Penalties in the Criminal Law of Penn-
sylvania, 3 VILL. L. REV. 142 (1958).
3. CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, at 141-44; MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited as M.P.C.]; MODEL SENTENCING ACT
(1963) [hereinafter cited as M.S.A.].
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 101-7505 (Supp. 1973).
5. S.B. 440, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA (Session of
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED CODE].
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Of necessity, any discussion of the proposed Code must be
made with a view toward the provisions of the newly enacted
Crimes Code0 which replaced a veritable patchwork of offenses
and penalties with a systematic classification of offenses reflecting
substantial differences in gravity: felonies of the first, second,
or third degree; misdemeanors of the first, second, or third de-
gree; and summary offenses. Each classification in turn dictates
the maximum sentence, by imprisonment or fine, which may be
imposed upon one convicted of a crime included within that clas-
sification.7 These sentence limitations will again be considered in
the discussions concerning imprisonment and fines.
II. SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
A. Total Confinement
Among the sanctions normally available to the sentencing
court, imprisonment has traditionally been thought to have the
greatest deterrent effect on both convicted and potential offend-
ers.8 The lengthy terms of incarceration imposed by the courts
have evidenced a general acceptance of this principle in Pennsyl-
vania and throughout the country.9 That the value of imprison-
ment is measured by its deterrent effect has met, however, with
growing disenchantment among penologists and legal writers who
advocate the view that rehabilitation and not deterrence should be
the goal of all penal systems.'0
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 101-7505 (Supp. 1973).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1101-05 (Supp. 1973).
Fine Imprisonment
Felony of the first degree $25,000 20 yrs.
Felony of the second degree 25,000 10 yrs.
Felony of the third degree 15,000 7 yrs.
Misdemeanor of the first degree 10,000 5 yrs.
Misdemeanor of the second degree 5,000 2 yrs.
Misdemeanor of the third degree 2,500 1 yr.
Summary Offense 300 90 days
Fine: The fine may also be set at an amount not to exceed double
the pecuniary gain derived from the offense by the offender
or any amount specifically authorized by statute.
Murder of the first degree: Either a sentence to death or to a
term of life imprisonment.
8. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS: THE COURTS 15 (1967).
9. E.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS: CORRECTIONS 29 (1967);
Murrah & Rubin, Penal Reform and the Model Sentencing Act, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 1167 (1965); George, An Unsolved Problem: Comparative Sentenc-
ing Techniques, 45 A.B.A.J. 250 (1959); Rodgers, The Geneva Conference
On Crime: It's Significance for American Penology, FED. PROB., DEC., 1955,
at 40.
10. E.g., Tappan, Sentencing under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW &
Existing Pennsylvania law requires that for any crime. punish-
able by imprisonment in a state penitentiary,1" the confinement
imposed must be for an indefinite term with both a maximum and
minimum term specified-the maximum term not to exceed the
statutory maximum for the offense and the minimum not to exceed
one-half of the maximum sentence prescribed by the court. 2 In
the event the offender is convicted of a crime punishable by
"simple imprisonment,"'Is the sentencing court is not bound to im-
pose an indefinite sentence but may in its discretion pronounce sen-
tence for either a fixed or indefinite term, in either event not to
exceed the maximum term prescribed as a penalty for such an of-
fense.' 4 Though the sentencing judge is bound to impose a mini-
mum sentence, at least in the case of the more serious offenses, it
is by now an established principle of law that the maximum term
imposed is the real sentence' 5 while the minimum only serves the
purposes of parole by prescribing the time when the defendant
should be deemed eligible for qualified release.16
CONTEMPT. PROB. 528 (1958); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMvfISSION ox LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, TASK FORcE REPORTS: THE
CouRTs at 15 (1967); Murrah & Rubin, Penal Reform and the Model
Sentencing Act, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1965).
11. "Punishable" means capable of being punished by imprisonment
in a state penitentiary, while imprisonment by separate or solitary con-
finement at labor is the equivalent of "Imprisonment in a state peniten-
tiary." Commonwealth ex rel. Oveido v. Baldi, 347 Pa. 601, 33 A.2d 12
(1943).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (1964). See Commonwealth v.
Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968); Commonwealth v. Francies, 75
Pa. Super. 269 (1920) (indeterminate sentence requirements may not be
discarded). But cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1086 (1964), which grants the
court no discretion as to the maximum term and restricts the minimum
term to no more than one-fourth of the statutory maximum; Common-
wealth ex rel. Hennessey v. Smith, 328 Pa. 308, 196 A. 3 (1938). Contra,
Commonwealth ex rel. Kehl v. Myers, 194 Pa. Super. 522, 169 A.2d 117,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1961), wherein the court held that a prisoner
could be confined in a state penitentiary although his sentence did not
include a minimum term; Commonwealth ex Tel. Reed v. Maroney, 194
Pa. Super. 514, 168 A.2d 800 (1961).
13. Simple imprisonment is confinement in a county jail or work-
house. Commonwealth ex rel. Monaghan v. Burke, 169 Pa. Super. 256,
82 A.2d 337, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951); Commonwealth ex rel.
Biancone v. Burke, 164 Pa. Super. 486, 66 A.2d 74 (1949).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (1964). See also Commonwealth
ex rel. Stewart v. Keenan, 177 Pa. Super. 223, 110 A.2d 921 (1955) (judge
has discretion to impose either a definite or indefinite sentence); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Green v. Court of Oyer and Terminer and Quarter
Sessions, Erie County, 176 Pa. Super. 103, 106 A.2d 896 (1954).
15. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
16. Commonwealth v. Kalck, 239 Pa. 533, 87 A. 61 (1913); Common-
wealth ex rel. Lycett v. Ashe, 145 Pa. Super. 26, 20 A.2d 881 (1941):
The maximum sentence imposed is the legal and valid sentence,
if within the limit prescribed by the legislature, and the minimum
sentence is merely an administrative notice by the court to the
executive department, calling attention to the legislative policy
that when a man's so called minimum sentence is about to expire,
the question of grace and mercy ought to be considered and the
propriety of granting a qualified Lrelease] be determined.
Id. at 30, 20 A.2d at 884.
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The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and ParoleT presently
has the exclusive power to parole all persons sentenced by any
Pennsylvania court to imprisonment in any state or county pris-
on or penal institution.' In the case of an indeterminate sen-
tence, the Board may grant parole only after the expiration of the
minimum sentence imposed by the court.19 Where a "flat" or
definite sentence has been imposed, the Board may grant parole
at any time.20 However, the Board's jurisdiction does not extend
to criminals sentenced to death or life imprisonment 2' nor to those
whose maximum sentence is less than two years unless the sen-
tencing court, by special order, directs the Board to supervise such
a person.22 Moreover, its jurisdiction does not extend to persons
imprisoned in any county jail, workhouse or other correctional in-
stitution, if sentenced by an alderman, justice of the peace, or
magistrate or if committed in default of payment of any fine.
2'
However, if the sentence imposed is for a term of less than two
years24 or the result of action taken by an alderman or magistrate,
the prisoner may still be paroled, upon his petition, by authority
vested in the Courts of Oyer and Terminer and the Courts of
Quarter Sessions.
25
The indeterminate sentence presently employed by the courts
is the result of a legislative attempt to combat the sentencing dis-
parity created by prescribed terms of mandatory confinement. It
was hoped that the flexibility inherent in a sentencing procedure
devoid of fixed terms would best remedy the situation.2 6 How-
ever, the minimum term provision of an indeterminate sentence it-
self fosters disparity by fixing a term of imprisonment during
which the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is effec-
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.2 (1964).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (1964). See Robinson v. Lar-
gent, 311 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See generally Comment, Penn-
sylvania Board of Parole, 58 DICK. L. REv. 84 (1953).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (1964). But see Commonwealth
v. Renya, 91 Pa. Super. 90 (1922) (prisoner given indeterminate sentence
paroled before serving minimum).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (1964).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (1964).
22. PA. STAT. ANn. tit. 61, § 331.17 (1964).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.17 (1964).
24. The court does not retain parole jurisdiction when the sentence
exceeds two years. Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Maroney, 45 Wash.
Co. 165 (1966).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 314 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §
331.26 (1964). See Commonwealth v. Harradine, 148 Pa. Super. 451, 25
A.2d 576 (1942), wherein the court ruled that the court's power of parole
is applicable only to those sentenced originally to a county jail for a defi-
nite term.
26. See M.S.A. § 1, Comment at 12.
tively denied the authority to exercise its trained discretion.27 The
proposed Code also prescribes a minimal period of confinement, not
in the sense of a fixed term, but rather a "minimum amount of con-
finement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defend-
ant."28 This concept does not constitute a complete rejection of
the deterrence principle, 29 in that the term of confinement would
remain partially a function of the gravity of the offense; but nev-
ertheless, it does rank the defendant's rehabilitative needs among
the major factors deserving of the sentencing court's considera-
tion.
The proposed Code would vary the existing law by establish-
ing sentencing criteria for total confinement, removing the mini-
mum sentence requirement, and expanding the powers of the Pa-
role Board. The sentencing criteria are to be considered in every
case where the sentencing judge contemplates the imposition of a
sentence to imprisonment. In light of these criteria the court would
be justified in imposing this sentence only if, with regard to the
nature of the crime and the defendant's circumstances, it is of the
opinion that to do otherwise would either jeopardize the public's
safety, deprive the defendant of required rehabilitative treatment
offered by an institution, or depreciate the seriousness of the de-
fendant's crime.30 In the event the sentencing court chooses total
confinement as the appropriate sentencing alternative for the de-
fendant under its consideration, it is only required, at the time of
imposing sentence, to fix a maximum period of confinement"1 not
to exceed the limit authorized for the crime.3 2 If however, the
court in its discretion does impose a minimum sentence, it may
not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence prescribed by the
court. If no minimum sentence is imposed, the defendant would of
course be eligible for parole at any time; furthermore, if parole has
not been granted at the end of six months, he must be considered
for parole at that time.3
3
The Code also contains provisions, similar to those presently
27. See note 19 supra.
28. PROPOSED CODE § 1321(b).
29. See note 8 supra.
30. PROPOSED CODE § 1325.
The court shall impose a sentence of total confinement if, having
regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the his-
tory, character, and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion
that the total confinement of the defendant is necessary for the
protection of the public because:
(1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or
partial confinement the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that
can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an insti-
tution; or
(3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the
crime of the defendant.
31. PROPOSED CODE § 1357(a).
32. See note 7 supra.
33. P opossa CODE § 1357 (b).
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in effect,3 4 which permit the court to impose a sentence without
a minimum but additionally without the right to parole. How-
ever, only in three specific instances may this procedure be fol-
lowed-when the defendant is charged with a summary offense,
when he is sentenced to imprisonment for non-payment of fines
or costs or both, and when the term of confinement is less than
thirty days. 35 The provisions concerning summary offenses and
non-payment of fines merely reflect the existing law whereas the
thirty day provision effects a significant reduction in the present
two year limitation which places the petty offender outside the
reach of the Parole Board.36 The proposed 30 day rule, obviously
a practical limitation in that the Parole Board cannot be expected
to function within a lesser period, would not only extend parole
possibilities to a large number of prisoners presently excluded
from its graces, but also to an even larger number of future
prisoners whose terms of confinement would no doubt be minimal
in light of the reduced sentences permitted under the new Crimes
Codes" and the liberal sentencing policies of the proposed sentenc-
ing code.
B. Partial Confinement
Existing Pennsylvania law38 provides that any person sentenced
to undergo imprisonment in a county jail or workhouse for a term
of less than five years may, at the time of sentencing or upon
subsequent application to the court, be permitted by court order
to leave the jail during necessary hours for either of sev-
eral specific purposes.3 9 The proposed Code40 also provides for
partial confinement if the facilities are available and it appears
that the defendant would not require a sentence to total confine-
ment,41 and it further appears that a sentence to probation would
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§ 331.17 (1964).
35. PROPOSED CODE § 1357(c).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.17 (1964).
37. See note 7 supra.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1171.1 (1964). See generally Com-
monwealth v. Hearn, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 49 (Bucks Co. 1966).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1179.1 (1968). The specific purposes
include:
(I) working at his employment,
(II) conducting his own business or other self-employed occupa-
tion, including in the case of a woman housekeeping and
attending to the needs of her family,
(III) seeking employment,
(IV) attendance at an educational institution or securing medical
treatment.
40. PROPOSED CODE § 1324.
41. See note 30 supra.
also be inappropriate. 42 However, the Code would broaden the
scope of this sentencing alternative by first deleting the present
five year maximum term limitation, and second, by expanding the
program to encompass prisoners in any correctional institution,
not just those serving sentences in county level institutions. More-
over, the specific purposes presently deemed appropriate for
partial release 43 would be expanded to include any other purpose
approved by the court. In addition, the court may include in its
order either of several enumerated conditions.
44
Both the existing law and the Code provide for the disposition
of any wages or salary earned by the defendant serving partial con-
finement. 45 Both empower an administrative official of the insti-
tution to either collect the wages or salary directly from the de-
fendant's employer, or require the defendant to turn it over when
received. However, the Code would vary the existing law with
regard to the disbursement made with the funds. Presently, six
specific disbursements of descending priority are allotted:
(I) The board of the prisoner; (II) Necessary travel ex-
pense to and from work and other incidental expenses of
the prisoner; (III) Support of the prisoner's dependents, if
any, the amount to be determined by the court; (IV) Pay-
ment of docket costs connected with the commitment of
the person; (IV) Payment either in full or ratably of the
prisoner's obligations acknowledged by him in writing or
which have been reduced to judgment; (VI) The balance,
if any, to the prisoner upon his discharge.
46
In contrast to the existing system of priorities the Code provides
four specific disbursements, each to be accorded equal weight:
(I) The board and personal expenses both inside and out-
side the institution of the defendant; (II) Installment on
fines, if any; (III) To the extent directed by the court, sup-
port of the dependents of the defendant; (IV) If sufficient
funds after such deductions are available, the warden or
other official may with the consent of the defendant pay
in whole or in part any of the debts of the defendant. Any
balance shall be retained and paid to the defendant upon
his discharge.47
C. Probation
Probation is simply the conditional release by the trial court
of a convicted offender who is placed under the supervision of a
probation officer.48 It is technically not a sentence,49 but is used
42. See note 55 infra.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. See note 70 infra.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1179.2 (1963); PROPOSED CODE § 1356(e).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1179.3 (1963).
47. PROPOSED CODE § 1356(e).
48. See generally Comment, A Survey of the Law and Probation and
Parole in Pennsylvania, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 309 (1957).
49. See Commonwealth v. Claudy, 171 Pa. Super. 143, 90 A.2d 638
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as a substitute for institutional commitment because it offers the
advantages of facilitating the reintegration of the offender into the
community and avoiding the negative aspects of imprisonment,
simultaneously reducing the state's financial burden.5 0 In re-
cent years it has received increased recognition in Pennsylvania
and throughout the country as an invaluable sentencing tool.51
In Pennsylvania the courts are granted much discretion in
making their determination as to whether probation would be a
fitting sanction for a particular offender. The pertinent statutes
offer little guidance as to what criteria may be properly considered
by the courts in making this determination. 2 Pennsylvania's most
recent act5 3 authorizes the sentencing court to place an offender on
probation if,
. . . it believes the character of the person and the circum-
stances of the case to be such that he is not likely again to
engage in a course of criminal conduct and that the pub-
lic good does not demand or require the imposition of a
sentence to imprisonment. 54
In contrast to these rather vague guidelines the proposed Code
offers a list of specific criteria which should be considered and
weighed by the trial judge evaluating the sentencing alternatives.55
(1952). Two Pennsylvania statutes provide that the sentence is sus-
pended before ordering the defendant to probation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1051 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1081 (1964). A third statute
provides that the probation order is in lieu of sentence. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 61, § 331.25 (1964).
50. TASK FORCE REPORTS: ThE Cou Ts at 17; Comment, Sentencing
under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code, 33 OHIo L.J. 490 (1972).
51. "The merits of the system of probation in the correctional proc-
ess are so obvious and so well known that it's increasing use should be
encouraged by all reasonable means." Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 201
Pa. Super. 649, 655, 193 A.2d 657, 660 (1963); M.P.C. §§ 6.01, 7.01; M.S.A.
§§ 1, 9 and Comments at 27.
52. See note 49 supra.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.25 (1964).
54. Id.
55. PROPOSED CODE § 1322.
The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the
court, shall be accorded weight in favor of a sentence to proba-
tion:
(1) The criminal conduct of the defendant neither caused
nor threatened serious harm.
(2) The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct
would cause or threaten serious harm.
(3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation.
(4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or jus-
tify the criminal conduct of the defendant, though failing to es-
tablish a defense.
(5) The victim of the criminal conduct of the defendant in-
duced or facilitated its commission.
(6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the
These criteria, although not exclusive, would subject each offender
to uniform considerations while insuring an "individualized" sen-
tence through detailed considerations.
At the present time there are three statutes defining the scope
of probation in Pennsylvania, each overlapping the other and
each being accorded varying degrees of authority.56 The first sta-
tute,5 7 embodied in the "Probation Act of 1909,"8 granted the
courts the power to suspend the imposition of sentence and place a
convicted offender on probation for a definite term,59 subject to
any conditions which the court may see fit to impose. However,
the statute excepted from its provisions those offenders who had
been previously imprisoned and those convicted of either of sev-
eral enumerated crimes. The Act of 1909 was subsequently sup-
planted by the "Parole Act of 1911,"6 ° which repealed only those
provisions of the former act which were inconsistent with the
new legislation. The Act of 1911 included provisions for proba-
tion similar in most respects to its predecessor,61 but in addition
expressly provided that the power to require the payment of money
for the use of the county was a proper condition to probation.
62
Provisions excluding those who were previously imprisoned or con-
victed of certain crimes were again included in the statute.
63
victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he
sustained.
(7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or
criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial
period of time before the commission of the present crime.
(8) The criminal conduct of the defendant was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur.
(9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate
that he is unlikely to commit another crime.
(10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirma-
tively to probationary treatment.
(11) The confinement of the defendant would entail exces-
sive hardship to him or his dependents.
(12) Such other grounds as indicates the desirability of pro-
bation.
56. See note 49 supra.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1081 (1964).
.58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1081-86 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§ 291-301 (1964).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1085 (1964): "The length of probation
shall not be less than the minimum nor more than the maximum term for
which the defendant could have been imprisoned."
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1051-57 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§ 314 (1964).
61. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1056 (1964): "The length of such
period of probation shall not be more than the maximum term for which
the defendant might have been imprisoned."
62. The costs of prosecution and sum for the use of the county may
not exceed the fine which could be imposed for the commission of the
particular offense. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 218 Pa. Super. 357, 280 A.2d
422 (1971).
63. For cases considering and applying both statutes see Common-
wealth v. Bennet, 212 Pa. Super. 393, 243 A.2d 128 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Meyer, 169 Pa. Super. 40, 82 A.2d 298 (1951); Commonwealth ex rel.
Leuw v. Myers, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 140 (York Co. 1966).
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The most current legislation, however, is the "Parole Act of 1941,"64
which contains provisions permitting more extensive use of this
sentencing alternative.6 6 Without repealing the former laws,66
the act grants the sentencing courts a greater amount of latitude
by eliminating the exceptions formerly applicable to those who
served prior sentences of imprisonment or were convicted of cer-
tain crimes. Only those convicted of first degree murder remain
exempt from possible probation. The Act further provides that
the maximum term of probation may not exceed the maximum
period for which one convicted of the offense could be sentenced
to imprisonment.
In contrast to the three statutes presently defining the scope
of probation, the Proposed Code 7 incorporates all their pertinent
provisions into one compact heading which simply permits the sen-
tencing court, after consideration of the probation criteria,68 to im-
pose a sentence to probation for a definite term not to exceed the
maximum term for which the defendant could be confined. No-
tably absent from this section are any provisions, such as found
in the existing statutes, which exclude persons convicted of certain
criminal acts from its coverage. However, such offenders would
undoubtedly satisfy very few of the probation criteria considered
by the sentencing court and would, in all probability, remain ex-
cluded from probation under the Code.
In contrast to the rather vague provisions contained in the
existing statutes authorizing the court to impose a sentence to pro-
bation "on such terms and conditions as it may deem right and
proper, '69 the code lists eleven specific conditions which may at-
tach to the court's probation order and additionally grants the sen-
tencing judge the discretion to attach any other conditions "rea-
sonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not un-
duly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331,1-34 (1964).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.25 (1964).
66. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 172 Pa. Super. 341, 94 A.2d 582 (1953).
67. PROPOSED CODE § 1355.
68. See note 55 supra.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1051; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1081
(1964). See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 218 Pa. Super. 357, 280 A.2d 422
(1971) (restitution); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 201 Pa. Super. 649, 193
2.2d 657 (1963) (sum for use of county and costs); Commonwealth v.
Keenan, 178 Pa. Super. 461, 116 A.2d 314 (1955) (sum for use of county);
Commonwealth v. Boshkoff, 177 Pa. Super. 231, 110 A.2d 834 (1955) (resti-
tution). Though the Act of 1941 does not expressly provide for attaching
conditions to the probation order, the Act of 1911 does so provide and con-
ditions may be attached pursuant to this authority. Commonwealth v.
Peterson, 172 Pa. Super. 341, 94 A.2d 582 (1953).
conscience.170 However, one of these conditions, the payment of
a fine,7 1 appears to contradict what is a firmly established princi-
ple that a fine cannot be imposed as a condition to probation. 2
The rationale for this principle is that a fine and a probation or-
der are mutually exclusive, the former acting as a sentence,73 the
latter acting as a substitute for a sentence14 or a form of restraint
imposed upon the suspension of sentence.75 A combination of
the two would convert the probation order into a sentence, thereby
subjecting the offender to double jeopardy in the event the court
later attempted to impose a sentence to imprisonment for viola-
tion of the terms of probation.7 6 However, in the event the lan-
guage of the Proposed Code may be interpreted so as to encom-
pass the situation where the offender's probation is being condi-
tioned upon the payment of a fine imposed in a separate and prior
action, the probation order would appear to remain separate from
the fine and not constitute a sentence.
70. PROPOSED CODE § 1355 (c):
The court may as a condition of its order require the defendant:
(1) To meet his family responsibilities.
(2) To devote himself to a specific occupation or employ-
ment.
(3) To undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment
and to enter and remain in a specified institution, when required
for that purpose.
(4) To pursue a prescribed secular course of study or voca-
tional training.
(5) To attend or reside in a facility established for the in-
struction, recreation, or residence of persons on probation.
(6) To refrain from frequenting unlawful or disreputable
places or consorting with disreputable persons.
(7) To have in his possession no firearm or other dangerous
weapon unless granted written permission.
(8) To make restitution of the fruits of his crime or to make
reparations, in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or
damage caused thereby.
(9) To remain within the jurisdiction of the court and to
notify the court or the probation officer of any change in his ad-
dress or his employment.
(10) To report as directed to the court or the probation offi-
cer and to permit the probation officer to visit his home.
(11) To pay such fine as has been imposed.
(12) To satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to
the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive
of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom or consciences.
71. PROPOSED CODE § 1355(c) (11).
72. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 201 Pa. Super. 649, 193 A.2d 657
(1963); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 172 Pa. Super. 341, 94A.2d 582 (1953).
73. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
74. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.25 (1964); Commonwealth v.
Duff, 414 Pa. 471, 200 A.2d 773 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Champion
v. Claudy, 171 Pa. Super. 143, 90 A.2d 638 (1952).
75. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1081 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1051 (1964). See also United States ex rel. Sole v. Rundle, 435 F.2d 721
(3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Duff, 414 Pa. 471, 200 A.2d 773 (1964).
76. See Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 201 Pa. Super. 649, 193 A.2d 657
(1963); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 172 Pa. Super. 341, 94 A.2d 582 (1953);
cf. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967), wherein the
Court ruled that while a probation order does not constitute a sentence in
the procedural sense, it does constitute punishment for the purposes of
determining the question of double jeopardy.
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In Pennsylvania, the revocation of a probation order has been
permitted in a number of circumstances. The large majority of rev-
ocations occur as the result of the probationer's violation of the
conditions attached to his probation." This form of revocation is
provided for by statute.7 Probation orders have also been re-
voked where the probationer made fraudulent misrepresentations
to the court 79 and where the court imposed an invalid probation
order.8 0 Moreover, the sentencing court may, in the exercise of
its discretion, revoke or modify a probation order any time during
the term of court in which the order was first imposed, or for a
period of thirty days from the date of entry of the original sen-
tence if the term of court terminates prior to the thirty day pe-
riod."' This power was long interpreted as also permitting the im-
position of an increased sentence or punishment,8 2 however, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently reversed this position, rul-
ing that the modification of a sentence by increasing punishment
violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
8 3
77. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Duff, 414 Pa. 471, 200 A.2d 773 (1964); Commonwealth v.
Ferguson, 201 Pa. Supre. 649, 193 A.2d 657 (1963). Commonwealth v.
Orsino, 197 Pa. Super. 306, 178 A.2d 843 (1962).
78. PA. STAT. ANNN. tit. 19, § 1055 (1964).
79. Commonwealth v. Myer, 169 Pa. Super. 40, 82 A.2d 298 (1951).
80. Commonwealth ex rel. Paige v. Smith, 130 Pa. Super. 536, 198 A.
812 (1938).
81. PA. STAT. AiqN. tit. 12, § 1032 (1967).
In any civil, criminal or equitable proceeding in which the court
has heretofore been vested with the power, jurisdiction and au-
thority to alter, modify, suspend, reinstate, terminate, amend or re-
scind, any order, decree, judgment or sentence only during the
term of court in which the order, decree, judgment or sentence,
was entered of record, the court in addition to such power . . .
shall hereafter have the same power . . . for a period of thirty
days subsequent to the date of entering of record . . . where the
term of court shall terminate prior to such thirty day period.
See generally Commonwealth v. Cole, 437 Pa. 288, 263 A.2d 339 (1970);
Commonwealth ex Tel. Taylor v. Myers, 208 Pa. Super. 417 (1966).
82. See Commonwealth v. Testa, 203 Pa. Super. 198, 199 A.2d 496
(1964); Commonwealth ex tel. Salger v. Dressell, 174 Pa. Super. 39, 98
A.2d 430 (1953), wherein the court pronounced that: "The power of the
courts to reconsider and alter its sentence, and even increase the punish-
ment, during the term at which it was pronounced, if nothing has been
done under it, is recognized generally in this county." Id. at 40, 98 A.2d
at 431.
83. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971).
Before this decision Pennsylvania's courts held that the proscription in
the United States Constitution against double jeopardy was not binding
upon the states and that the double jeopardy provision in Pennsylvania's
Constitution, Art. I, § 10, applied only to capital offenses. See Common-
wealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967); Commonwealth ex tel.
The proposed Code also contains provisions similar to those
found in the existing statutes, permitting the sentencing court, in
its discretion, to terminate, lessen, or increase the conditions upon
which a sentence to probation has been imposed.8 4 However, in
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that an order plac-
ing a defendant on probation, though not a sentence in the pro-
cedural sense, does constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes,85 the subsequent imposition of additional or more severe
conditions to the probation order would in effect provide for in-
creased punishment in violation of the prohibition against double
jeopardy. In addition to the provisions permitting the modifica-
tion of conditions, the Code would empower the court to revoke
a probation order for violation of any attached conditions, and to
impose any of the sentencing alternatives that were available to
the court at the time of initial sentencing.8 6 In light of the fore-
going discussion on subsequently attached conditions this provi-
sion could only apply to the violation of originally attached condi-
tions-those subsequently attached being unconstitutional in the
first instance. In this regard the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has ruled that a sentencing court clearly has the right to later mod-
ify or revoke a probation order if the originally attached condi-
tions are violated and that such action does not place the pro-
bationer in double jeopardy.
7
In the event the court does revoke its order, the probation vio-
lator is presently not entitled to "credit" for time served on pro-
bation."" The Code, however, would assume a contrary position
Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d 814 (1965). However, the Supreme
Court of the United States in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969),
ruled that the double jeopardy prohibition in the United States Constitution
is binding on the states. In the wake of this ruling the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in its Silverman decision decided that "if the issue is ever
reached, the United States Supreme Court will rule that a modification
of a sentence imposed on a criminal defendant which increases the punish-
ment is double, and we now so rule." 442 Pa. at 217, 275 A.2d at 312.
84. PROPOSED CODE § 1371.
85. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967).
While an order placing a defendant on probation under the provi-
sions of the Acts of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1055, § 1, 19 P.S. § 1051, and
August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, § 25, 61 P.S. § 331.25 is not a judgment of
sentence as that term is construed for the purposes of procedure,
it does, in our view, constitute punishment for the purposes of
determining the question of double jeopardy. It is unquestion-
ably a restriction on the defendant's freedom and a deprivation of
his liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 200, 213 A.2d at 309.
86. PROPOSED CODE § 1371 (b).
87. Though the court in Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231
A.2d 301 (1967), ruled that a sentence to probation does constitute "punish-
ment," it further noted that the power to later revoke probation, for the
failure to comply with a condition attached as part of the original order,
remains within the discretion of the sentencing judge.
88. See Commonwealth ex rel. Champion v. Claudy, 171 Pa. Super. 143,
90 A.2d 638 (1952); cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21(a) (1964), which
provides for credit under certain circumstances for parole violators. But
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and require the court to give this time "due consideration" before
imposing the subsequent sentence.89 Furthermore, the court would
be prohibited from imposing a sentence of total confinement on the
probation violator unless it found that: (i) the defendant has been
convicted of another crime, or (ii) his conduct indicates that he is
likely to again commit crime if not imprisoned, or (iii) such a sen-
tence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.90
D. Guilt Without Further Penalty
Probation caseloads inevitably include a number of offenders
who do not require supervision because they neither require re-
habilitative treatment nor represent a threat to the public.91 In
Pennsylvania, this is to a large degree the result of the courts' in-
terpretation of the existing statutes on probation. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has ruled that by the Act of 1911 and 1941,
"the legislature manifested a mandate to the courts that where no
sentence is imposed, the defendant should be placed on proba-
tion."92 Furthermore, the courts have ruled that these same Acts
preclude an indefinite suspension of sentence.9
3
In contrast to the present state of the law, which apparently
precludes any action on the part of the court to completely absolve
a defendant of any penalty, the Proposed Code empowers the court
to impose a sentence of "guilty without further penalty. ' '5 4 The use
of this sentencing alternative is suggested where probation would
be proper in light of the criteria given for that sentence,95 but
would be unnecessary for the correction of the defendant or the
protection of society. Though not expressly stated as such, it ap-
pears that this proposal would constitute a form of suspended
sentence without probation.9 6 The increased use of this proposal
would obviously result in lighter probation caseloads, permitting
the Board of Probation and Parole to devote a far greater propor-
tion of its time than it now can to the difficult cases, those for
whom expert supervision is needed.
see Commonwealth v. Scheetz, 217 Pa. Super. 76, 268 A.2d 193 (1970)
(suggests consideration be given for time served on probation).
89. PROPOSED CODE § 1371(b).
90. PROPOSED CODE § 1371(c).
91. M.S.A. Comment at 27.
92. Commonwealth v. Duff, 414 Pa. 471, 473, 200 A.2d 773, 775 (1964).
93. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 212 Pa. Super. 393, 243 A.2d 128
(1968); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 212 Pa. Super. 92, 239 A.2d 833 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Giovengo, 188 Pa. Super. 220, 146 A.2d 629 (1959).
94. PROPOSED CODE § 1323.
95. See note 55 supra.
96. See M.S.A. Comment at 27.
E. Fine
Another form of correction that avoids institutionalization is
the fine, a pecuniary punishment the purpose of which, like im-
prisonment, is to punish violators and deter future violations. It
has found its greatest application as a sentence for non-dangerous
offenders; however, its increased use for felony convictions has
been advocated by courts and legal writers alike.9 7
In Pennsylvania the fine is extensively used as a means of pun-
ishment, as evidenced by the myriad statutes containing provi-
sions for its application.98 It may be used alone or in conjunction
with other sentencing alternatives. Generally, the statute provid-
ing for a fine states the maximum amount which may be imposed,
while the actual amount levied is left to the discretion of the sen-
tencing judge who has all the facts before him. 9 Subject to that
maximum amount and/or constitutional restrictions against exces-
sive fines,10 0 the sentencing judge may use the fine for its maxi-
mum deterrent value by raising the amount to whatever sum he
deems necessary to discourage future or continued violations of
the law.1 1
Though the fine has been extensively employed by the courts,
there remains a dearth of legislation defining its scope or the pro-
cedural rules to be followed when imposing it. The few existing
statutes simply provide for the disposition of the receipts 10 2 and
empower the sentencing court to impose fines payable in install-
ments.10 3 The lack of statutory guidance is aptly illustrated by a
97. See M.S.A. Comment at 28; Mastrangelo v. Brickley, 433 Pa. 352,
250 A.2d 447 (1969); Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 84 Pa. Super. 224 (1924).
98. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 283 (1958) (Fish Laws); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, § 1311 (1967) (Game Laws); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1481
(1963) (Aviation Laws).
99. See Commonwealth v. Flickenger, 365 Pa. 59, 73 A.2d 652 (1950).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13. See Com-
monwealth v. Smith, 409 Pa. 521, 187 A.2d 267 (1963) (The test generally
imposed is whether the amount is "reasonable" in light of the offense and
the statutes purpose).
101. See Mastrangelo v. Brickley, 433 Pa. 352, 250 A.2d 447 (1969).
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 951 (1964).
All fines imposed upon any party, by any court of criminal
jurisdiction, shall be decreed to be paid to the Commonwealth, but
the same shall be collected and received, for the use of the respec-
tive counties in which such fines shall have been imposed as afore-
said, as is now directed by law.
See generally In re Collection of Fines, Costs, Forfeited Bail and Recog-
nizances, 76 Pa. D. & C. 456, 461-62 (Lycoming Co. 1950).
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 (1964):
Any person sentenced to pay a fine or to pay the costs of any
criminal proceeding against him, either in addition to or without a
term of imprisonment ... may, in the discretion of the sentencing
authority, be given leave to pay such fine or costs by install-
ments.
PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 954 (1964):
The sentencing authority shall fix the amount of each installment
and the dates of payment; but no order giving such leave shall
prescribe a period longer than twelve months for the completion of
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recent Pennsylvania decision in which the court imposed a fine of
$4,663.00 for a violation of the Game Laws-resulting in the im-
position of a thirteen year term of imprisonment upon the failure
of the insolvent defendant to satisfy the penalty. 0 4 This inequity
was only avoided by the statutory provision which permits an in-
solvent defendant to obtain a release after three months impris-
onment.1o5
The Proposed Code provides that the court may sentence the
defendant to pay a fine only when, "having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character
of the defendant, it is of the opinion that the fine alone suffices for
the protection of the public." 10 6 The fine may be used in conjunc-
tion with sentences to confinement or probation; however, such
use would be limited to only those instances in which the defendant
has derived a pecuniary gain from the crime or the court is of
the opinion that a fine is specially adapted to deterrence of the
crime involved or to the correction of the defendant. 10 7 More-
over, before the fine may be imposed at all, either alone or in con-
junction with the other sentencing alternatives, certain criteria
must be satisfied. 0 8 These criteria would preclude the imposition
of a fine if the defendant would be unable to pay it or if it would
prevent him from making restitution to the victim of his crime.
The Code would also permit the defendant to satisfy his obli-
gation by making installment payments, but in contrast to exist-
ing procedures which impose a one year limitation, the court could
order more flexible payment schedules. 0 9 In addition, the court
may provide an alternative sentence which would be imposed in
the event the defendant defaults on his obligations." 0 With no
alternative sentence, if the defendant inexcusably defaults, the
payment of the entire fine or costs.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 955 (1964):
Upon default in payment of any one installment, under any such
order, the entire unpaid balance of the fine or costs shall at once
become due and payable.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19. § 956 (1964):
An order . . .giving leave to pay a fine or costs by installments,
shall not bar the sentencing authority from issuing a warrant of
commitment against the defendant, but the execution of such war-
rant shall be stayed until default occurs in the payment of any in-
stallment.
104. Litzelman Appeal, 207 Pa. Super. 374, 217 A.2d 838 (1966).
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 13 (1954).
106. PROPOSED CODE § 1326.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. PRoposED CODE § 1359.
110. Id.
court may find the defendant guilty of contempt and sentence him
to as much as six months imprisonment, providing the term im-
posed could have been levied for the offense originally charged. 1
If, however, the fine was $300.00 or less, the term of confinement
may not exceed thirty days."
2
III. SENTENCING PROCEDURES
A. Pre-Sentence Investigation and Report
The existing disparity in sentences is in large part attributable
to practices which fail to provide the sentencing judge with ade-
quate information. *i3 If a sentence is to conform to the rehabili-
tative needs of the defendant, the judge must be provided with all
the information concerning the offender which could have any
probably bearing upon the sentencing decision.11 4 A detailed pre-
sentence investigation and report, supported where necessary by
psychiatric study, is the best method for obtaining this vital infor-
mation.1 1 5
Pennsylvania's criminal courts have long recognized the value
of the pre-sentence investigation and report as a tool in the
sentencing process,1 1e although it is only in recent years that this
procedure has been required by statute.1 7 Presently, an investiga-
tion and report is required of the Probation service in each case
where the offender faces a possible maximum sentence of two or
more years,"18 but this requirement may be waived by the sentenc-
111. PROPOSED CODE § 1372.
112. Id.
113. See CRIME IN A FREE SocIEY 144 (1967); Clark, Sentencing and
Corrections, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 1 (1971). See generally R. Tappon,
CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORRECTION (1960).
114. Id.; see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), wherein the
Court stated that:
... [h]ighly relevant . . . if not essential . . . to selection of an
appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.
Id. at 247.
115. See M.S.A. § 2 Comment at 15; M.P.C. § 7.07 Comment (Tentative
Draft No. 2 at 52). Also recommended as a presentence tool are "experi-
ence tables" which list rates of recidivism for various sentences given to
offenders convicted of the same type of crime. See generally T. Clark,
Sentencing and Corrections, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 1, 7 (1971).
116. See Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 89 A.2d 782 (1952);
Commonwealth v. Fox, 214 Pa. Super. 470, 257 A.2d 331 (1969); Common-
wealth v. Orsino, 197 Pa. Super. 306, 178 A.2d 843 (1962).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 890 (Supp. 1972). See Commonwealth
v. Cox, 214 Pa. Super. 470, 257 A.2d 331 (1969), wherein the court noted
with respect to this statute that "although the act has no formal retroactive
application, its principles have governed over criminal law for many
years." Id. at 473, 257 A.2d at 334.
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 890 (a) (Supp. 1972) provides:
In all cases where the statutory maximum sentence is for two
years or more, the probation service shall make a pre-sentence in-
vestigation and report to the court before the imposition of sen-
tence or the granting of probation unless the court otherwise di-
rects.
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ing judge whenever he is of the opinion that no pre-sentence re-
port is necessary. 119 In the event the defendant faces a maxi-
mum possible sentence of less than two years, but the sentenc-
ing judge is of the opinion that a pre-sentence report is necessary,
he may request the probation officer to submit a report. 120 The
Proposed Code would retain most of the provisions presently in
force but would extend the required use of the pre-sentence re-
port to all cases where the defendant faces a possible maximum
sentence of one or more years, with the exception of sentences to
death or mandatory life imprisonment. 121 However, the Code also
retains the provision permitting the court to exercise its discretion
and waive the required report.
22
The reports presently used by the courts conform to standards
promulgated by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role. 2 The pertinent statute124 only requires that the report
include any prior criminal record'2 5 and information regarding the
offender's characteristics, financial condition, and circumstances af-
fecting his behavior. 126  Obviously, these requirements are some-
what vague, and in effect grant the investigator charged with
preparing the report 127 great discretion in determining what infor-
mation the sentencing judge will receive. In contradistinction,
the Proposed Code delineates specific types of information deemed
pertinent to every pre-sentence report. 28 This information would
be required in addition to any other matters which the investiga-
tor believes relevant or that the court directs be included. In
119. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Virola, 18 Chest. 301 (1970).
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 890(b) (Supp. 1972).
121. PROPOSED CODE § 1331.
122. Id.
123. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 890 (d) (Supp. 1972).
124. Id.
125. See Commonwealth ex rel. Wildrick v. Myers, 199 Pa. Super. 85,
184 A.2d 158 (1962); Commonwealth ex reL. Gouch v. Myers, 196 Pa.
Super. 285, 175 A.2d 158 (1961).
126. See Commonwealth v. Bell, 417 Pa. 291, 208 A.2d 465 (1965),
wherein the court stated that "it is the duty of the court to consider ...
all evidence culpatory and exculpatory, incriminating and extenuating,
including what manner of man the criminal is and has been." Id. at 297,
208 A.2d at 468; Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959)
(age a factor); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 89 A.2d 782 (1952);
Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 101 Pa. Super. 308 (1931) (health).
127. The large majority of pre-sentence reports are prepared by the
Board of Probation and Parole; however, similar reports have been se-
cured from other agencies or groups. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 164
Pa. Super. 158, 63 A.2d 508 (1949), where the court requested the "Commit-
tee of Seventy," a civic organization, to gather certain information on a
defendant about to be sentenced.
128. PROPOsED CODE § 1332.
addition to the reports submitted by the Board of Probation and
Parole, an appropriate agency must determine and report the sta-
tus of all charges previously brought against the defendant and
whether he is serving another sentence or is entitled to any credit
for time previously served in confinement. 129 Furthermore, the
court may secure a psychiatric report by ordering the defendant to
submit to observation and examination, for a period not to exceed
sixty days, at any available institution.13 0 Though not provided
by statute, the concept of a pre-sentence psychiatric report is not
an innovation to Pennsylvania's courts which have often used such
studies as sentencing aids in conjunction with medical reports. 3 1
The detailed information required by the Code to be contained
in every pre-sentence report will undoubtedly result in a more uni-
form system of pre-sentencing reporting. The merits of such a
system are obvious, but detail is required for yet another reason:
the sentencing criteria 3 2 which the judge must consider before
choosing from the various sentencing alternatives. The specificity
of these criteria require the degree of detailed information that
could only be found in an equally specific pre-sentence report.
Perhaps the most controversial issue in the area of pre-sen-
tence reporting is that of disclosure-who should have access to
the information contained in the reports.1 3  The most acute point
of the controversy is whether the defendant is entitled to know
the contents of his report, including the sources of information
contained therein. Those who would deny a disclosure of the re-
port to the defendant argue along four traditional lines: first, the
fear that sources of confidential information would terminate their
services in the event that the defendant became aware of their
identity; second, that disclosure would cause additional delay in
an already overburdened criminal justice system; third, that dis-
closure of certain medical information would have a deleterious
effect on the offender's chances for rehabilitation; and fourth,
that investigators can be trusted to compile truthful and accurate
reports." 4 Those who advocate a disclosure of the pre-sentence re-
129. PROPOSED CODE § 1337.
130. PROPOSED CODE § 1336. The court could also avoid placing the
defendant into an institution by simply appointing a qualified psychiatrist
to make the examination. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pomponi, 447 Pa. 154,
284 A.2d 708 (1971). See also Note, Self-Incrimination and the Compulsory
Psychiatric Examination, 77 DicK. L. REV. (1972).
131. See Commonwealth v. Howard, 426 Pa. 305, 231 A.2d 860 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Carter, 402 Pa. 48, 166 A.2d 44 (1960) (psychiatric re-
ports are not binding upon the courts); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa.
70, 89 A.2d 782 (1952).
132. See notes 30, 55 supra.
133. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 214
(Tent. Draft, December 1967); M.S.A. § 4 Comment at 15; M.P.C. § 7.07
Comment at 52.
134. Id. See also Hinks, In Opposition to Rule 34(c)(2), Proposed
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port to the defendant, counter with the arguments that: first, the
sources of confidential information should be revealed in order that
the defendant may protect himself from possible slander; second,
the contention that disclosure would result in a possible delay in
the criminal proceedings is no excuse for a denial of fundamental
fairness; third, if the disclosure of certain medical information
could adversely effect the defendant's chances for rehabilitation,
then only the debilitating information should be withheld; and
fourth, although as a general rule investigators can undoubtedly
be trusted to compile truthful and accurate reports, it remains
that the defendant would know better than the investigator when
faulty information is being volunteered.
3 5
Though the controversy is by no means settled, it appears that
the weight of modern authority requires disclosure of these re-
ports.13 6 In Pennsylvania, the law on disclosure has maintained a
neutral posture by placing the entire question within the judge's
discretion. 3 7 However, the proposed Code would adopt a position
favoring the emerging majority view.'3 8 It would require the
sentencing court to afford both the prosecution and defense a rea-
sonable opportunity to examine the report, though the court would
still retain its discretion to require counsel not to disclose or copy
specified parts of the report.'3 9 Furthermore, the court would be
authorized to conduct a pre-sentence conference or to produce ad-
ditional reports or statements after notice from either party of
their intention to challenge the pre-sentence report. 40 Though
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 FED. PROB. 3 (1944); Comment,
Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV.
821 (1968); Comment, Confidentiality of the Pre-Sentence Report: A Middle
Position, 28 FED. PROB. 8 (1964).
135. Id. Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (counsel required
at sentence revocation). Contra, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949) (pre-sentence reports outside the protection of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
136. United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 911 (1970); United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282
(3d Cir. 1970); CRimE IN A FREE SOCITY (1967); Comment, Procedural
Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821 (1968);
cf. M.S.A. § 4 (disclosure required only when defendant sentenced for
serious offense). But see M.P.C. § 7.07 (sources of confidential informa-
tion need not be disclosed).
137. See Commonwealth v. Phelps, 220 Pa. Super. 235, 281 A.2d 769
(1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Lockhart v. Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531,
165 A.2d 400 (1960). The pertinent statute with regard to pre-sentence
reporting, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 890 (Supp. 1972), does not address the
issue of disclosure.
138. PROPOSED CODE § 1334.
139. Id.
140. PROPOSED CODE § 1335.
these provisions do not provide for complete disclosure to defend-
ants in all cases, they do appear to be "fundamentally fair"'
41
and undoubtedly foreclose any constitutional questions regarding
the right to effective counsel.
142
In addition to making the contents of the report available to
counsel, the Code provides that the report may also be made avail-
able, upon court order, to persons or agencies having a legitimate
professional interest in the report and, of course, to reviewing
courts when relevant to any issue to which an appeal has been
taken.1 43 Examples of parties or agencies deemed to have such a
legitimate interest include: (1) a physician or psychiatrist ap-
pointed to assist the court in sentencing, (2) an examining facil-
ity, (3) a correctional institution, and (4) a department of proba-
tion or parole.
144
B. Plea of Guilty to Murder
In Pennsylvania a plea of guilty to a murder constitutes a plea
of guilty to murder generally, establishing felonious killing-mur-
der of the second degree. 45 The burden is upon the Common-
wealth to establish the essential elements of first degree murder.146
Furthermore, when a defendant enters a plea of guilty to murder
the court rather than the jury fixes the degree of murder and de-
cides upon the penalty. 147 The degree of guilt is determined at a
hearing' 48 where both parties are given the opportunity to pre-
sent evidence on the issue.' 49 If after hearing the Commonwealth's
141. See Commonwealth v. Phelps, 220 Pa. Super. 235, 281 A.2d 769
(1971) (dissenting opinion), wherein Justice Hoffman would require
that sentencing procedures comport with due process requirements;
M.S.A. § 4, Comment at 15. But see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949).
142. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Phelps, 220 Pa. Super. 235, 281 A.2d 769 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Com-
monwealth v. Fox, 214 Pa. Super. 470, 257 A.2d 331 (1969); State v. Kunz,
55 N.J. 138, 259 A.2d 895 (1969).
143. P OPOSED CODE § 1333.
144. Id.
145. Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661 (1970); Com-
monwealth v. Ahern, 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966); Commonwealth v.
Markle, 394 Pa. 34, 145 A.2d 544 (1958); Commonwealth v. Kurus, 371 Pa.
633, 92 A.2d 196 (1952).
146. Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 334, 223 A.2d
699 (1966); Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947).
147. Commonwealth v. Moseley, 444 Pa. 134, 279 A.2d 174 (1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Saddler v. Maroney, 422 Pa. 13, 220 A.2d 846 (1966);
Commonwealth ex rel. Dillinger v. Russel, 422 Pa. 155, 220 A.2d 619 (1966).
148. The hearing is not a trial upon the merits but rather an aid to
the court in determining either the degree of the offense or the proper
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 436 Pa. 423, 260 A.2d 742 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Cavanaugh, 183 Pa. Super. 417, 133 A.2d 288 (1957); Commonwealth
ex rel. Uhler v. Burke, 172 Pa. Super. 108, 91 A.2d 913 (1952).
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § Rule 319A (Supp. 1968). See also
Commonwealth v. Moseley, 444 Pa. 134, 279 A.2d 174 (1971).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
evidence the judge is of the opinion that the case may constitute
murder of the first degree, "he may secure the assignment of two
other judges of like jurisdiction and power to sit with him to hear
the evidence and decide all issues of law and fact."150
Pennsylvania's Proposed Sentencing Code' 51 would retain the
same procedure presently followed when a defendant pleads guilty
to murder, but with one major exception. Whereas the existing
statutory provision authorizes the judge to use his discretion in
determining whether to empanel two other judges, the Code would
make it obligatory. However, once the judges are empaneled, both
the existing statute and the Code provide that the decision as to
the degree of murder is by a majority of the panel; if the crime is
determined to be first degree murder the sentence is life imprison-
ment unless the judges unanimously agree upon a sentence to
death. 5 2 In the event the panel determines that the crime does
not constitute murder of the first degree, the sentence is deter-




Pennsylvania's Proposed Code of Sentencing Procedure func-
tions upon the premise that sentencing is best served by consider-
ing the offender rather than the offense, and by considering the
needs of society and the rehabilitative needs of the individual,
rather than the outmoded dictates of retribution and deterrence.
Any sentence which imposes punishment exceeding that required
by these considerations is a disservice to both the offender and an
already overburdened penal system. Whereas the present sentenc-
ing process offers the defendant few procedural safeguards and
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § Rule 319A (Supp. 1968). See Common-
wealth v. Moseley, 444 Pa. 134, 279 A.2d 174 (1971), wherein the court
noted that:
The express language of this rule makes it crystal clear that the
trial judge can, at his discretion, impanel two other Judges....
There is nothing in the wording of the rule which mandatorily
requires a three-Judge panel.
Id. at 137, 279 A.2d at 176. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Duncan v.
Rundle, 424 Pa. 385, 227 A.2d 659 (1967); Commonwealth v. Cater, 402 Pa.
48, 166 A.2d 44, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 914 (1960). There is no constitutional
requirement for a three judge panel in such circumstances. Commonwealth
ex rel. Rook v. Myers, 402 Pa. 202, 167 A.2d 274 (1961); Commonwealth
ex Tel. Pickwell v. Burke, 372 Pa. 450, 93 A.2d 482, cert. denied, 345
U.S. 958 (1952).
151. PROPOSED CODE § 1311.
152. See note 147 supra.
153. Id.
oftentimes unnecessary incarceration, the Code would subject the
defendant to uniform sentencing considerations and procedural
rules which would predictably result in fewer sentences to con-
finement. This result reflects the modern view on sentencing
policy and hopefully offers the proper answer to Pennsylvania's
sentencing problems.
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